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1Abstract
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 created an exemption to patent infringement for activities that constitute uses
reasonably related to the process of seeking FDA approval for a drug. Although intended to help generic drug
manufacturers enter the market more quickly, the courts have interpreted this exemption in such way that they
have created a loophole that allows individuals and corporations to proﬁt from activities that would otherwise
constitute patent infringement. As long as these activities could arguably be connected to one of the many stages
in the FDA approval process, a potential infringer is shielded from an infringement suit. The current state of the
law is not the balance Congress sought to strike between patent holders, their competitors, and researchers.
Introduction
By 1984, Congress was increasingly concerned with the runaway costs of prescription drugs. A recent Federal
Appeals Court decision had held that the holders of drug patents could prevent competitors from beginning the
process of applying for FDA approval of their generic substitutes until the relevant patents expired. Since the
FDA approval process took quite a bit of time, the holders of drug patents received a de facto extension of the
term of their patents until the generic alternatives could be approved. Without competition from generic drugs,
manufacturers of patented drugs could keep prices high.
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 sought to both streamline the approval process for generic drugs and also end
the de facto patent term extension by allowing generic drug manufactures to engage in the activities necessary to
2secure FDA approval before the patents expired. This way, the generic substitute could enter the market as soon
as the relevant patents expired.
The language of the statute implementing this goal is potentially broader than the goal itself. Companies began
to push the limits by engaging in activities with purposes unrelated to or secondary to securing FDA approval.
Early court cases strictly limited the types of activities allowed under the statute. More recently, however, the
courts have adopted a more broad approach that does not look to the purposes of the activities in question, but
to the activities themselves. Any activity that arguably falls within one of the stages of the FDA approval process
is not patent infringement.
This broad interpretation of the statute has opened the door to the possibility of abuse. Anyone conducting a
clinical trial under the FDA’s regulations is arguably shielded from patent infringement suits. However, investi-
gators conduct clinical trials under FDA supervision for a wide variety of reasons, many not for the purpose of
seeking FDA approval, and many having nothing to do with generic substitutes. Thus this broad interpretation
exempts infringing activity that Congress did not express an intent to exempt.
Aside from being inconsistent with Congress’ intent, this broad interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act under-
mines the patent system’s ability to promote scientiﬁc progress by preventing patent holders from realizing the
rewards of their inventions.
The Problem
Part 1: The Limited Grant of Exclusivity
3Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of
...useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ...Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...Discoveries.” The
useful arts are promoted by a bargain the government makes with inventors. In exchange for the ﬁnancial rewards
that accompany the exclusive right to an invention, the inventor discloses to the world how his invention works.
The inventor’s grant of exclusive rights is only for a limited time, so that at the end of that time his invention
passes into the possession of the public. The Constitution leaves to Congress the task of deciding the length of
this period of exclusivity. This enables Congress to decide what period of time best promotes the progress of
discovery by adequately rewarding inventors while making their inventions available to beneﬁt the public as soon
as possible.
Since June 8, 1995, the term of a utility patent issuing from an application ﬁled in the United States Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce runs from the date a patent is granted until twenty years from the date the application was
ﬁled.1 At the time of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,2 the term of a patent began the date a patent was granted
and ended seventeen years later. Patents ﬁled before June 8, 1995, but still in force as of that date have a term
equal to the longer of the term calculated using the “twenty years from ﬁling date” method or the “seventeen
years from issuance” method.3
135 U.S.C. § 154.
2Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1985 (1984).
335 U.S.C. § 154(c).
4Part 2: Drugs and Medical Devices4 May Not be Sold in the U.S.
without FDA Approval
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) provides that “No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce
any new drug, unless an approval of an application ﬁled pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) is eﬀective with respect to
such drug.” Subsection (b) deals with the procedures required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a
New Drug Application (NDA). Subsection (j) deals with the procedures for an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). ANDA’s are generally used for drugs or active ingredients that are similar or equivalent to those already
approved by the FDA pursuant to an NDA, which are often called pioneer drugs. The ANDA procedure is most
often used by manufacturers of generic drugs. The requirements under an ANDA are less strict and less time
consuming than under an NDA, which is expected since another manufacturer has presumably shown that the
drug meets the FDA’s requirements.
In order to submit an application for approval of a new drug, the FDA requires the manufacturer to show that
the new drug is safe and eﬀective.5 This process requires many steps. The ﬁrst stages of testing are normally
done in animals. Once the pharmacology,6 pharmacokinetics,7 and toxicology8 of the drug in animals are known,
investigators may decide that further testing in humans (clinical trials) appears to be safe and might produce
beneﬁcial results.
To begin testing in humans would require the introduction of an unapproved drug into interstate commerce, which
would violate 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). The statute provides an exception to many of the requirements of § 355 for
drugs used for research in § 355(i). The FDA has set up the Investigational New Drug (IND) process to regulate
4This paper generally approaches the issue from the point of view of drugs, but the Hatch-Waxman Act has been held to
apply to medical devices as well. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). The procedures for gaining FDA
approval of medical devices are roughly analogous to those for drugs; at least as far as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is concerned.
521 U.S.C. § 355(d).
6Pharmacology refers to the properties of a drug that make it medically eﬀective.
7Pharmacokinetics refers to the way in which a drug is absorbed, processed, and eliminated by the body.
8Toxicology refers to the extent to which a drug is poisonous and the eﬀect of that poison on the body.
5the use of drugs for testing in humans.
The FDA’s regulations divide testing in humans into three phases; Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3.9 An investigator
generally submits an IND application for each new study.10 Phase 1 studies include the initial introduction of
the drug into humans.11 These studies are used to judge the pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and toxicology of
the drug in humans.12 The side eﬀects associated with increasing dosage are also evaluated.13 The information
learned from Phase 1 studies is used to design Phase 2 studies so that the Phase 2 studies will produce scientiﬁcally
valid results.14
Phase 2 studies are controlled studies conducted to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the drug for a particular indication
in patients with the disease being studied.15 These studies evaluate the short-term side eﬀects and risks associated
with the drug.16 They include a smaller number of people than a Phase 3 study, typically no more than several
hundred subjects.17
Phase 3 studies are expanded studies, usually performed after preliminary evidence that the drug is eﬀective is
obtained.18 They gather the information needed to make an overall risk-beneﬁt judgment regarding the drug.19
These studies often include several thousand subjects.20 Phase 3 studies are often referred to as “pivotal”
studies because the information they generate provides a basis for the FDA’s decision on whether to approve an
NDA. Although not required by statute or regulations, most drugs undergo two pivotal studies to generate the
information needed for a decision by the FDA on whether to approve them.21
921 C.F.R. § 312.21.
10Id.
1121 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).
12Id.
13Id.
14Id.
1521 C.F.R. § 312.21(b)
16Id.
17Id.
1821 C.F.R. § 312.21(c)
19Id.
20Id.
21See Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Cases and Materials 527 n.2 (2nd ed. 1991).
6As one can imagine, all of these steps take time and must be done one after the other, not at the same time, since
each step requires information from the previous step. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimates
that the average drug takes twelve years to go through this process.22 In 1980, the House Subcommittee on
Science, Research, and Technology estimated the time to be 7-13 years.23 A generic equivalent under the ANDA
process takes less time because much of the same testing is not required. However, the manufacturer must show
that the generic equivalent is bioavailable24 and bioequivalent25 to the already-approved drug.26 These showings
may also require extensive testing lasting several years.
The Patent Term Distortion
The mere fact that the FDA approval process takes some time distorts the term of a patent. Sometimes this
distortion has the eﬀect of eﬀectively shortening the period of enforceability of a patent. This can be seen when
an inventor invents a new drug and then ﬁles a patent application. The day he ﬁles that application, the clock
begins to run on his patent term and if issued, that patent will expire twenty years after he ﬁled the application.
Before he can commercially exploit his invention, however, the inventor must get the FDA to approve the use of
the drug. Once the patent issues, every day that the inventor must wait for FDA approval is another day of his
patent term that is lost. Since the FDA approval process can take 7-10 years or more27, the term of the patent
22See http://www.allp.com/drug dev.htm.
23Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th
Congress, 2nd Session (1980).
24Bioavailability refers to the extent a drug moves through the body and becomes available at the site of drug action. See 21
C.F.R. § 320.1.
25Bioequivalence refers to drugs that are absorbed by the body in the same general manner. See 21 C.F.R. § 320.1.
2621 U.S.C. § 355(j)
27See Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., , 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
7may be eﬀectively cut in half or worse.
The inventor could try to minimize this loss of patent term by delaying his ﬁling date, but this presents several
risks. The inventor has one year from the date the invention becomes public due to a public use, oﬀer for sale,
or printed publication to ﬁle for a patent,28 whether the inventor authorized the publication of his invention or
not. If another person ﬁled for a patent for the same invention before the inventor ﬁled, the burden of showing
prior invention would be on the inventor.29 The inventor may intend to ﬁle overseas, and most countries award
patents to the ﬁrst entity to ﬁle for a patent, not the ﬁrst to invent. But once the inventor ﬁles overseas, he has
only the longer of one year or until the foreign patent issues to ﬁle in the U.S.30
Such delays in ﬁling are inconsistent with the goals of the patent system favoring prompt public disclosure
of inventions.31 The Hatch-Waxman Act dealt with this problem by providing for patent term extensions for
unavoidable delays due to the FDA approval process.32
The FDA approval process might also distort the term of a patent by eﬀectively lengthening it. This situation
arises near the end of the term of a patent for a drug. Once the patent expires, other drug companies have the
right to make and sell the patented drug or a drug that contains the patented ingredient (often referred to as a
generic substitute) under the patent laws. However, this other drug company must get FDA approval in order to
sell its version of the drug. Since any use of the patented drug would be patent infringement, the other company
cannot begin the process of obtaining FDA approval until the day the patent expires. The entire period from
the end of the patent term until the generic drug is approved is a period of exclusivity for the patentee since the
patentee is the only one able to make and sell the drug. This period is an eﬀective lengthening of the patent
28See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
29See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
30See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d).
31See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
32See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
8term.
The Need for § 271(e)(1) – Roche
Before 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) was enacted, a generic drug manufacturer who made, used, or sold a patented drug
infringed the patent. Congress currently deﬁnes infringement by declaring, “[W]hoever without authority makes,
uses, oﬀers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States ...infringes the patent.”33 Any one
of these acts, even taken alone, constitutes infringement.34
A manufacturer seeking to market a new drug or generic equivalent of a current drug needs to submit an NDA
or ANDA and in order to do so, would have to have conducted the various applicable studies discussed above.
However, the manufacture of a drug intended to be used in any kind of study would be infringement. Likewise, the
actual use of a patented drug in an animal or clinical study would constitute infringement. Selling the patented
drug to those who are actually doing or participating in any studies would also be infringement, even if the drug
were sold at cost. Thus a manufacturer who wanted to submit an NDA or ANDA would have to wait until the
day after any patent expired to begin the process that leads up to its ability to do so.
The party accused of infringement (the defendant) in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. tried to
3335 U.S.C. § 271(a)
34See Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964).
9argue that the so-called “Experimental Use” exception applied to its activities.35 The defendant Bolar decided it
wanted to market a generic equivalent to patentee Roche’s drug Dalmane once Roche’s patent expired.36 About
six months before the patent expired, Bolar obtained from a foreign manufacturer37 ﬁve kilograms of the drug’s
active ingredient to use to make dosage form capsules, which it would “use to obtain stability data, dissolution
rates, bioequivalency studies, and blood serum studies necessary for a New Drug Application to the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”38 Roche sought to enjoin Bolar from using the patented drug for any
purpose whatsoever until the patent expired.39
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit40 framed the legal question simply: “[D]oes the limited use of a
patented drug for testing and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval requirements during the last 6
months of the term of the patent constitute a use which, unless licensed, the patent statute makes actionable?”
The court answered in the aﬃrmative.
Bolar tried to argue that the so-called “Experimental Use” exception should be applied to its activities. There has
never been such an exception provided for by statute. The origin of this doctrine appears to be an opinion written
by Supreme Court Justice Story while riding circuit in 1813. The doctrine created an exception for the use of a
patented machine for non-economic purposes. As Justice Story wrote, “It could never have been the intention of
the legislature to punish a man who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the suﬃciency of the machine to produce its described eﬀects.”41 By 1890, the principle
made its way into the authoritative treatise by W. Robinson:
35733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36Id at 860.
37Since Roche, Congress has amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to include within in the deﬁnition of infringement one who imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent.
38Roche, 733 F.2d at 860.
39Id.
40The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent appeals from the district courts and from
proceedings in the U.S. Patent Oﬃce.
41Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
10The interest of the patentee is represented by the emoluments which he does or might receive
from the practice of the invention by himself or others. These, though not always taking the
shape of money, are of pecuniary character.... Hence acts of infringement must attack the right
of the patentee to these emoluments, and either turn them aside into other channels or prevent
them from accruing in favor of any one. An unauthorized sale of the invention is always such an
act. But the manufacture or the use of the invention may be intended only for other purposes,
and produce no pecuniary result. Thus where it is made or used as an experiment, whether
for the gratiﬁcation of scientiﬁc tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the
patentee are not antagonized, the sole eﬀect being of an intellectual character in the promotion
of the employer’s knowledge or the relaxation aﬀorded to his mind. But if the products of the
experiment are sold, or used for the convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are
conducted with a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimentor’s business, the
acts of making or of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and infringements of his
patent.42
Since the use in Roche was clearly “for the convenience of the experimentor” and was conducted in order to
commercially exploit the patented product in the future, the experimental use doctrine did not apply. The court
held, “We cannot construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in
the guise of ‘scientiﬁc inquiry,’ when that inquiry has deﬁnite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes.”43
Bolar then tried to argue that the court should create a “public policy” exception for its conduct. Bolar pointed
to the eﬀective patent term extension created by the FDA approval process as discussed above and characterized
it as a conﬂict between the patent statute and the FDA statute. The court did not view this as a conﬂict between
statutes. “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as eﬀective.”44 The court pointed out that because “[L]aws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject,
we must presume Congress was aware that the FDCA would aﬀect the earning potentiality of a drug patent, and
chose to permit it.”45 The court practically invited Congress to take up the issue. “We decline the opportunity
43Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
44Id at 864 [citations omitted].
45Id. [citations omitted].
11...to engage in legislative activity proper only for the Congress.”46
The Reversal of Roche: § 271(e)(1)
Part of the Hatch-Waxman Act contained Congress’s response to the invitation to reverse Roche. It did so by
declaring certain acts to be not infringement, where such acts would otherwise be considered infringement. The
result is codiﬁed in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) which states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, oﬀer to sell, or sell with the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention ...solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use or sale of drugs ....
The House Report on the proposed legislation speciﬁcally cites the eﬀective extension of the patent term in light
of the length of the FDA approval process and the recent decision in Roche as the motivating factor for the
provision.47 Prevention of such experimental activity “would extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity
beyond the patent expiration date.”48
The report stated that to best fulﬁll the purpose of the patent clause in the Constitution,49 the limited time
granted to a patentee “[S]hould be a deﬁnite time and, thereafter, immediate competition should be encouraged.
Congress’s vision was that since the FDA approval process could be started before the patent expired, this would
result in the eﬀective approval date of a drug being “the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original
product.”50 Thus economic competition could begin the day the patent’s exclusive grant expired.
Judicial Interpretation of § 271(e)(1)
With a new statute in place, it was now up to the courts to decide what that statute meant51 as various cases
46Id at 863-864.
47H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
48Id.
49Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.
50H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
51See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (it is “the province and duty of the judicial
12arose in which parties accused of infringement sought to exempt their activities under § 271(e)(1). A quick reading
of the language of § 271(e)(1) reveals that the language Congress chose is potentially broader than the problem
it was intended to solve. Deciding how much broader was up to the courts.
Scripps
One of the ﬁrst cases to deal with the breadth of § 271(e)(1) was Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc.52 in 1987. That case involved an infringement action over Human Clotting Factor VIII:C.
The plaintiﬀ developed a process for purifying and concentrating Factor VIII:C from human and animal blood
plasma and patented the process, the product, and the product made by the process.53 The defendant Genentech
developed a process for making Factor VIII:C using recombinant DNA technology. Genentech, intending to market
its Factor VIII:C in the United States, submitted an ANDA to the FDA in an attempt to get FDA approval.
Genentech also applied for a European patent, worked on developing a process to commercially manufacture
Factor VIII:C on a large scale, and sold some of its Factor VIII:C to one of its partners for its use. Because
Genentech was using and selling the patented product, it was found to infringe the plaintiﬀ’s patents.
Despite these facts, Genentech moved for summary judgment of no infringement on the grounds that its activities
were covered by § 271(e)(1). Genentech argued that although not all of its activities were done solely for
department to say what the law is.”).
52666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modiﬁed on other grounds 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aﬀ’d in part, rev’d in
part, vacated in part, remanded on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
53Product-by-process claims cover a product, but only if the product is made by the process described in the claim. Thus an
identical product made by a diﬀerent process would not infringe the product-by-process claim. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Badische Anilin
& Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884).
13FDA approval, all bore “some reasonable relationship to such purposes and hence [were] noninfringing under §
271(e)(1).”54
The court was confronted with interpreting the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related to the development of
information under a Federal law...” in § 271(e)(1). One possible interpretation would be that “solely” applied
literally to the word “uses.” Under such an interpretation, only uses whose purposes were expressly related to the
FDA approval process would qualify for exemption under § 271(e)(1). Another interpretation, the one urged by
Genentech, would be that any use reasonably related to the FDA approval process would be exempted, even if
such use had other purposes or goals.
The court chose the ﬁrst interpretation. The court reasoned that Genentech’s interpretation would, “in eﬀect,
eliminate the express statutory limitation ‘solely for’ and thereby immunize any use of a patented invention so
long as some aspect of that use is reasonably related to FDA testing.”55 The court found that this reading deﬁed
“the plain mandate of the statute and the intent of Congress.”56
The court used the history of the statute to support its reasoning. The court noted that the § 271(e)(1) was
passed in response to Roche and that the use found to constitute infringement in Roche was “limited” to “testing
and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval.”57 There was no reason to believe that Congress intended
to provide broader protection.
The court also pointed to the comments in the House Report which indicated that the authors intended the
exemption to be narrow. The comments provide that “a generic drug manufacturer may obtain a supply of a
patented drug product during the life of the patent and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those
tests is to submit an application to FDA for approval.”58 The House Report went further by stating that “the
only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can
54Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1396.
55Id.
56Id.
57Roche, 733 F. 2d. at 861.
58H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689.
14establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute.”59
The court concludes, “Even if the uses ...were reasonably related to meeting FDA requirements, they certainly
were not solely related to that purpose. These sales and uses [serve] multiple purposes unrelated to meeting FDA
requirements [and] clearly lie beyond the protection of § 271(e)(1).”60
Such an interpretation is consistent with the history and stated purpose of the statute, and carves out a quite
narrow exemption to infringement. It is not, however, the only reasonable interpretation of the statute’s meaning.
Intermedics
Four years later, the same District Court as Scripps (Northern District of California) decided Intermedics, Inc., v.
Ventritex, Inc.61 and reached a starkly diﬀerent result. In Intermedics, the defendant Ventritex had developed an
implantable deﬁbrillator that it intended to market commercially. Intermedics had obtained seven patents that it
argued covered the product developed by Ventritex. Ventritex began clinical trials of the device believing it was
immune from claims of infringement under § 271(e)(1). Intermedics sued for infringement and Ventritex moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that its activities were protected by § 271(e)(1). Intermedics moved for
summary judgment on the theory that § 271(e)(1) did not apply because the defendant intended to commercialize
its product prior to the expiration of Intermedics’ patent.
The court ruled for the defendant Ventritex on both motions. First the court addressed the argument that
Ventritex’s intent to commercialize its infringing device before the patent expired brought its activities outside
the “safe harbor” of § 271(e)(1). Then the court addressed Ventritex’s argument that its activities fell within the
59H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692.
60Scripps, 666 F. Supp. at 1396.
61755 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aﬀ’d without opinion, 991 F. 2d. 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precidential).
15“safe harbor” of § 271(e)(1) as a matter of law.
Plaintiﬀ Intermedics’ Motion for Summary Judgment that § 271(e)(1) does not Apply
Intermedics ﬁrst argued that Congress’ intent should be used to interpret § 271(e)(1); an argument that proved
persuasive in Scripps. Since “a reason Congress passed § 271(e)(1) was to prevent a patent holder from obtaining
the de facto extension of its patent-monopoly which would otherwise occur if the alleged infringing manufacturer
had to wait until the expiration of the patents-in-issue to start the investigations necessary to secure FDA ap-
proval,”62 Intermedics argued that the only permissible use of the patented product was that which resulted in
the infringer entering the market after the patent expired.
The court rejected this argument on several grounds. One ground had to do with the diﬃculty of bringing the
concept of intent into the inquiry. The court ﬁrst notes the diﬃculty of ascertaining subjective intent in a “natural
person,” much less the diﬃculty of “searching for such a thing in a corporate body or other business organiza-
tion.”63 Furthermore, it would be diﬃcult to argue that a defendant’s activities were outside of § 271(e)(1) if
the defendant did not actually commercially market its infringing product before the patent expired. Even if a
particular defendant intended to commercially market his device before another party’s patent expired and then
changed its mind, the activities in which it engaged in order to get FDA approval would be indistinguishable
from those engaged in by a party who did not intend to commercially market its device before the other party’s
patent expired. As the court points out, “Surely Congress was not concerned about clearing certain ‘unacceptable’
thoughts or hopes or visions out of certain persons’ minds.”64
62Id at 1273.
63Id.
64Id.
16Had the court stuck with this argument alone, it could have ruled on the plaintiﬀ’s motion and not needed to
further analyze the issue. Instead the court chose to address the plaintiﬀ’s arguments with respect to Congress’s
intent and found a totally diﬀerent intent than the court in Scripps. Here, the court found that Congress’ primary
concern “was not with the de facto length of patent holders’ rights.”65 Instead, Congress’ primary concern was
“to create a legal environment that would enable new, medically beneﬁcial, cost-competitive products to reach
the general marketplace in meaningful volume just as soon as the undistorted operation of the patent laws would
permit.”66
The diﬀerence, the court says, is an emphasis on the positive instead of the negative.67 The court believed that
it was Congress’ intent that the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) would be available to “every party who might be in
a position to enter the general market place when the relevant patents expire.”68 (emphasis added) The court
contrasts this with what it characterizes as the plaintiﬀ’s view that this protection would be available “only to
those parties who would enter the general marketplace after the relevant patents expired.”69 (emphasis added)
Put another way, Congress wanted to protect research and investigational activities that might lead to a party
entering the market, whether or not the party actually does enter or is even sure it will try.
While this is certainly true, it does not fully address the plaintiﬀ’s argument. What if a party was engaged in
activities that might fall under § 271(e)(1), but that party was engaged in those activities for purposes that did not
involve obtaining regulatory approval after the patent expired? Clearly, whether a party ultimately decides to seek
regulatory approval to market its product is not determinative. The House Report states, “A party which develops
such information, but decides not to submit an application for approval, is protected as long as the development
was done to determine whether or not an application for approval would be sought.”70 It would seem that if
65Id.
66Id.
67Id at 1274.
68Id.
69Id.
70H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
17a party could show that a potential infringer had no intent to seek FDA approval after the patent expired, the
infringer’s activities would not be covered by § 271(e)(1). Such a showing of the intent of a corporation might be
diﬃcult, but this relates to the ﬁrst ground the court used to reject the plaintiﬀ’s argument as discussed above.
By going further, the court has broadened the scope of § 271(e)(1) protection to include activities which may not
be related to seeking FDA approval as long as a party can argue that such activities could be.
In order to rebut the plaintiﬀ’s suggestion that the statute’s focus is on activities done with the purpose of
seeking FDA approval, the court must be able to disregard part of the House Report that says “a generic drug
manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug product during the life of the patent and conduct tests using
that product if the purpose of those tests is to submit an application to FDA for approval.”71 (emphasis added)
To do so, the court declares that much of the legislative history relied on in Scripps deals only with drugs and does
not apply to medical devices. The court notes that with generic drug manufacturers, the testing done during the
life of the patent involves bioequivalency, which necessarily uses the patented drug because the generic drug is
compared to the patented drug in the tests. The court distinguishes the medical device approval process because
it points out that there is no analogous ANDA process involving bioequivalency for devices. A manufacturer must
test his device and show it is safe and eﬀective even if a similar device is already approved. The court points out
that because the potentially infringing manufacturer is not actually using the patentee’s device, it may not believe
that it is infringing at all since it may not believe that its device infringes the patent. If a potentially infringing
manufacturer does not believe it is infringing, then it would have “no reason to wait until the expiration of the
allegedly infringed patent to begin commercial marketing.”72
This reasoning seems ﬂawed to in several respects. First of all, there is a path similar to an ANDA for medical
devices. There are two general ways in which a medical device may be lawfully introduced into commerce.73 The
71H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689.
72Id.
73There is also a third way, involving reclassiﬁcation from a Class III device to a Class I or II device under § 513(f)(2) of the Food,
18ﬁrst is by submitting a Pre-Market Approval (PMA) application that is then approved by the FDA.74 This process
is similar to the NDA process. The other general way to gain approval is by submitting a Pre-Market Notiﬁcation
(PMN) under § 510(k) of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) for a device that is substantially
equivalent to a device that was on the market before the 1976 Amendments to the FDCA (called a “preenactment
device”). “Substantial Equivalence” is deﬁned in §§ 513(f)(1) and 515(b)(1) of the FDCA. The FDA has also
taken the position that a new device may claim substantial equivalence to a device on the market that claimed
substantial equivalence to a preenactment device.75 This concept is known as “piggybacking” and can result in
chains of claims of substantial equivalence. This second route, by which a device claims substantial equivalence
to a preenactment device, accounted for the way in which more than 98 percent of new medical devices entered
the market between 1976 and 1991.76 In the abstract, a potentially infringing manufacturer would need to “use”
an approved, patented device to compare with its own device in order to claim substantial equivalence in the same
way that a generic drug manufacturer would. Thus the court’s distinction does not seem to hold up.
Secondly, the defendant Bolar in Roche was not accused of using the patentee’s drug – Bolar obtained the drug
from a foreign manufacturer.77 Since this case provided the motivation for § 271(e)(1), there is no indication that
Congress intended § 271(e)(1) to cover only the use of the patentee’s product (manufactured by the patentee)
by a generic manufacturer in its testing process. The source of the drug is irrelevant since a party infringes the
patent by using a drug or device that is claimed in the patent, regardless of who made it. Very often, the accused
infringer might make the infringing product itself.
Third, a defendant’s subjective belief that it is or is not infringing a patent is not relevant to the question of
infringement.78 If a manufacturer begins to commercialize an infringing device, it will be liable for infringement
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
74See § 515 of the FDCA.
75See Oﬃce of Technology Assessment, FEDERAL POLICIES AND THE MEDICAL DEVICES INDUSTRY, OTA-H-230, at 104
(Oct. 1984).
76See Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Cases and Materials 752 (2nd ed. 1991).
77Roche, 733 F.2d at 860.
78A defendant’s subjective belief may be relevant to the question of willful infringement, which may, at a court’s discretion, result
19whether it believed it infringed or not.
Fourth, the court seems to suggest that it is somehow diﬃcult to know if a device infringes a patent, while the
issue of whether a drug infringes a patent is clear. This seems to me to be backwards; mechanical devices are less
abstract and easier for a patent attorney to analyze for infringement than chemical products. In any event, a party
that wants to “know” if it is infringing should seek the advice of a patent attorney. Any reasonable manufacturer
who markets a device with the intent that it will compete with a patented device will always, out of fear of treble
damages, consult a patent attorney who will be able to tell the manufacturer whether it is infringing.
In light of the above, and of the Eli Lilly case, the distinction the court makes between drugs and devices seems
to be incorrect. It is interesting that the court uses this distinction to justify its disregarding of much of the
legislative history that is inconsistent with the conclusions it reaches.79
Defendant Ventritex’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds that § 271(e)(1) Covers its Activities
In ruling that § 271(e)(1) did cover Ventritex’s activities, the court was again confronted with the issue of
“purpose.” Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀ wanted the court to consider non-infringing activities as evidence that not
all of the defendant’s infringing activities were done with the purpose of obtaining FDA approval.
The court ﬁrst noted that non-infringing activities are not patent infringement. An inquiry under § 271(e)(1) is
concerned only with acts that would otherwise be infringement; other acts need no protection. The plaintiﬀ’s
argument was that these acts may be relevant inasmuch as they show the purposes behind the defendant’s
infringing acts.
The court decided again that the defendant’s purposes were not relevant to the inquiry. First, the court points
in enhanced damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 284; Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, (7th Cir. 1983).
79See the court’s treatment of this same legislative history in Scripps as discussed supra.
20out that Congress used the word “uses” in the statute and that the words “uses” and “purposes” are not
interchangeable. “Obviously, Congress is familiar with the word ‘purposes.’ If Congress had wanted the courts
to focus on ‘purposes’ it probably would have selected that word instead of the substantially more awkward word
‘uses.”’80 The selection of word “uses,” according to the court, meant that Congress intended an objective test,
focusing on conduct rather than motive or intent.81 The fact that Congress selected the phrase “reasonably
related” to modify uses is further evidence of this intent because of that phrase’s association with objective
standards.82 The court also notes the fact that subjective tests are falling out of favor because of the diﬃculty
of inquiring into motive and intent and the necessity of a jury trial to do so.83
The court also notes that other purposes are almost always present even in cases where a party would clearly be
covered by § 271(e)(1). Simply put, manufacturers seeking FDA approval also have, as their primary purpose,
the goal of making a proﬁt. The fact that a party has as its purpose the ability to make a proﬁt at some point
should not disqualify a party from being aﬀorded the protection of § 271(e)(1).84
With all of the above in mind, the court formulated the following oft-quoted85 test:
Would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in the defendant’s situation to believe
that there was a decent prospect that the “use” in question would contribute (relatively directly)
to the generation of the kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in the processes by
which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product?86
Notice how much broader this test is than the one formulated in Scripps.87 Under this test, one would assume
80755 F. Supp. at 1278.
81Id.
82Id at 1279.
83Id.
84Id at 1279-1280.
85See, e.g., Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1998); Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Mass. 1995),
aﬀ’d, 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D.N.J. 1994).
87It should also be noted that the court in Intermedics never cites or distinguishes Scripps. While it is true that Scripps was a
district court opinion that was in no way binding on the court in Intermedics, one might expect the court in Intermedics to at least
acknowledge the Scripps opinion and either criticize or at least distinguish it.
21the statute read, “for any use reasonably related to FDA approval.” The Scripps case would certainly have come
out the other way under this test.
The Federal Circuit’s Approach
The approach taken in the Intermedics case has won out. In both Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc.88 and AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,89 the Federal Circuit adopted the reasoning in Intermedics. In both cases,
the plaintiﬀs argued that because the defendant used information gained from activity related to FDA approval
for other purposes (such as raising capital), the activity should not be covered by § 271(e)(1). In both cases, the
court disagreed.
In Teletronics, the court pointed out that the economics of drug and device manufacturing require companies to
do a lot of other things besides just seek FDA approval in order to market their drugs and devices. If Congress
intended that after a patent expired, “immediate competition should be encouraged,”90 it had to also intend for
manufacturers to be able to raise money and do other things necessary to be able to start competing immediately.
“It would strain credulity to imagine that Congress was indiﬀerent to the economics of developing and marketing
drugs and medical devices when it enacted § 271(e)(1).”91
Similarly, the court in AbTox interpreted § 271(e)(1) to allow other uses of information that was generated in
activities that otherwise fall under the safe harbor. The court states that the statute “does not look to the
88982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
89122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
90H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
91Teletronics, 982 F.2d at 1525.
22underlying purposes or attendant consequences of the activity.”92 Not only does the statute not look to purposes,
those purposes are irrelevant even if, presumably, they indicate that the potential infringer has no intention of
ever obtaining FDA approval, but has some other purpose in mind (such as taking sales and goodwill from the
patentee). “As long as the activity is reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, [the defendant’s] intent or
alternative uses are irrelevant to its qualiﬁcation to invoke the section 271(e)(1) shield.”93
More Recently: Amgen
More recently, the court in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc.94 took a crack at the meaning of
the statute. Amgen held patents on a genetically engineered hormone used for treating anemia. The defendants
had produced the patented hormone and used it to conduct various tests that generated information that would
be sent to the FDA. The plaintiﬀ asserted that the defendant was also seeking regulatory approval overseas and
designed some of those tests to meet other countries regulatory standards. Even though the information in those
tests would be sent to the FDA and potentially used by the FDA to approve the defendant’s drug, the purpose of
conducting them was, the plaintiﬀ alleged, to get foreign regulatory approval and not to get FDA approval.
The court ruled that the activities were protected since intent and purpose were not part of the relevant inquiry
under the statute. The court noted that the phase used in the statute, “solely for uses reasonably related” is
not equivalent to a more restrictive phrase that the plaintiﬀ seemed to be arguing for: “use is solely for purposes
reasonably related.”95
While this is certainly true, it is not clear that the test articulated in Intermedics is the equivalent of the statutory
language either. That test drops the word “solely” altogether. The court rejects the plaintiﬀ’s contention (and
the Scripps opinion) that the word “solely” is rendered superﬂuous by the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in a
92AbTox, 122 F.3d at 1030.
93Id.
943 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
95Id at 107.
23footnote.96 Yet it provides no explanation of why this is so. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to see how the Intermedics test
would change if the statute were to read “for uses reasonably related” with “solely” omitted altogether.
The court notes that “many uses, such as animal testing, human clinical trials, or chemical composition analysis,
may be related to FDA approval, yet be conducted for purpose other than, or in addition to, obtaining FDA
approval.”97 The court goes on to characterize Federal Circuit precedent as holding that “ulterior motives or
alternate purposes do not preclude application of the section 271(e)(1) exemption.”98 Neither the phrase “ulterior
motives” nor the phrase “alternate purposes” can be found in the relevant Federal Circuit precedent. “Alternative
uses” is a phrase found in the AbTox case.99 Given this and other similarly minded courts’ views on the diﬀerences
between the word “use” and the word “purpose,” I would think the court would be more careful. However, I will
concede that the prior cases hold that intent and purpose are not relevant.
The use of the phrase “ulterior motives” arguably goes farther than any court before. “Ulterior motives” are
bad motives, motives that are usually not condoned by the law. The word “ulterior” is deﬁned in the American
Heritage Dictionary as follows: “Lying beyond what is evident, revealed, or avowed, especially being concealed
intentionally so as to deceive: an ulterior motive.” 100 (emphasis in original) The dictionary uses the phrase
“ulterior motive” as illustrative of usage when the meaning is “concealed intentionally so as to deceive.” The
court seems to be saying that as long as the defendant can meet the objectively reasonable test of Intermedics, it
does not matter if the defendant is only using the possibility of eventually considering the seeking of FDA approval
with deception, as cover to infringe a patent with impunity.
From Scripps to Amgen, the test went from “solely for uses reasonably related” to “it does not matter why you
are doing it just as long as you can point to some way in which what you are doing arguably relates to some step
in the process of obtaining FDA approval, whether or not you are or have any intent of seeking or even thinking
96Id at 108 n.3.
97Id at 107-108.
98Id at 108.
99Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1030.
100The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition (2000).
24about seeking such approval at some point in the future.” Similarly, the purposes of a parties activities are no
longer relevant to a court’s inquiry even though the authors of the legislation wrote, “The purpose of [§ 271(e)(1)]
is to establish that experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial
activity which will begin aftera valid patent expires, is not a patnet infringement.” 101 (emphasis added)
Under the test articulated by the court in Intermedics, it seems that, as a general rule, anyone using a patented
drug under an IND for any of the three phases of investigation would be shielded from an infringement action
by § 271(e)(1). Phase 3 investigations generate the information needed to gain approval, which can certainly
be considered the kind “of information ...likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would decide
whether to approve the product.”102 Phase 1 and 2 studies have a “decent prospect” of contributing to the
generation of information needed for Phase 2 and 3 studies, respectively. Indeed, each phase is designed to
contribute to the next. Since any activity under any of the phases must be done pursuant to an IND, all activities
properly under an IND are covered by § 271(e)(1).
The IND Process103
“Almost all new drugs in the United States are developed by large pharmaceutical ﬁrms.”104 Yet these large
corporations often do not perform the clinic trials themselves. “Clinical investigations on new drugs are usually
conducted by academic physicians working in university medical centers and by physicians in private practice. These
investigations are frequently conducted on behalf of sponsoring drug ﬁrms, and the results may be published in
101H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
102Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.
103Much of the information on the IND process is taken from the FDA’s discussion of the proposed and ﬁnal versions of the rules
relating to the IND process, mainly 21 C.F.R. §§ 312 and 314. The proposed rules were issued in September 1983 and the ﬁnal rule
was issued in March 1987. This time period coincides with the Roche decision and the passage of § 271(e)(1). The Intermedics case
followed a few years later. Accordingly, the facts, statistics, and reasoning in this rulemaking process are particularly relevant to the
present discussion since they reﬂect the world in which § 271(e)(1) and its early interpretations were decided.
104Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26720, 26723 (June 9, 1983).
25the medical literature.”105 The pharmaceutical company shepherds the drug through the stages of investigation
from animal testing through the Phase 3 investigation. The IND’s necessary in this process are referred to as
“commercial INDs.” The FDA deﬁnes a commercial IND as “an IND submitted by a pharmaceutical company or
research center for the purpose of collecting safety and eﬃcacy data necessary to gain marketing approval.”106
In addition to commercial IND’s, the FDA reviews “sponsor-investigator IND’s.”
The FDA deﬁnes a sponsor-investigator IND as an IND “submitted by an individual researcher, often associated
with an academic institution, in order to conduct exploratory therapeutic research or to use the drug as a research
tool.”107 Consistent with the exploratory nature of these IND’s, sponsor-investigator IND’s “may involve either
an unapproved drug or an approved drug for an unapproved use.”108 The results of this exploration may be used
to justify proceeding with the next stage of research. Or “if results from this research suggest marketing potential
for the drug, further studies are usually conducted under the auspices of a commercial IND.”109
Another type of IND is the “treatment IND.” “The term ‘treatment IND’ applies to a request by a practicing
physician to administer an unapproved drug primarily for treatment purposes within the investigational context.”110
Treatment IND’s are used when physicians wish to treat “patients with serious disease conditions who are not
responsive to approved therapies, such as in the case with orphan drugs.”111 This type of use is ordinarily allowed
only after a Phase 2 investigation has been completed such that a good deal is known about the safety and dosage
eﬀects of the drug.112
Since sponsor-investigator IND’s and treatment IND’s are applied for by individuals or smaller institutions, they
105Id.
106Id.
107Id.
108Id.
109Id.
110Id.
111Id at 26724.
112Id.
26do not normally go through the entire three phase investigation process.113 As one would expect, they are rarely
used for Phase 3 studies, which require tremendous resources. They are, however, evaluated the same way that
a commercial IND would be, depending on the phase.114
As of 1983 (just before the Hatch-Waxman Act), the FDA received “approximately 1,100 IND’s for new drug
and biological products each year.”115 Only about 25 percent of the IND’s received were commercial IND’s.116
The largest percentage of IND’s were sponsor-investigator IND’s, which made up about 45 percent of all IND’s
received.117 The remaining 30 percent or so were treatment IND’s.118 Since manufacturers of generic drugs
presumably all qualify as large pharmaceutical companies, any IND’s they apply for would be commercial IND’s.
Thus only a maximum of one quarter of all IND’s could potentially be applied for by manufacturers of generic
drugs. Indeed, the percentage must be much smaller since all the pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. are
presumably doing research on new drugs as well.
IND’s and Approved Drugs
When the FDA approves a drug for use, it approves it for certain uses, i.e., to treat certain conditions in certain
doses. The approved uses and dosages are set forth in the oﬃcial labeling that accompanies the drug’s packag-
ing.119 As long as a manufacturer has FDA approval for a drug and ships the drug with the proper oﬃcial labeling,
113Id at 26723.
114While it is true that some provisions of the Federal Regulations apply only to commercial IND’s, others only to sponsor-investigator
IND’s, and others only to treatment IND’s, they are all examined the same way on the merits.
115Id at 26724.
116Id.
117Id.
118Id.
119See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5
27it has satisﬁed its duty under the FDCA,120 which ends at the moment of shipment into interstate commerce.121
Thus if a physician decides to prescribe that drug for a use or in a dosage that is not consistent with the oﬃcial
labeling, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for this potentially unauthorized use.
The FDA has taken the position that such “oﬀ label” use is not prohibited under the FDCA. “[T]he physician
may, as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully prescribe a diﬀerent dosage for his patient, or may otherwise
vary the conditions of use from those approved in the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval
of the Food and Drug Administration.”122 The FDA views this type of use as “the practice of medicine” which
it maintains is not subject to regulation under the FDCA.123
Despite the fact that physicians are not required to ﬁle an IND in such circumstances, they may wish to anyway.124
It may be in the best interests of a physician and the public that the therapeutic results and adverse reactions
obtained by submitted to the FDA.125 Often times physicians will be motivated by the moral and ethical issues
surrounding the safety of the patients involved.126 Other times, physicians will be partially motivated by the
interest in advancing science, which may be facilitated by following the FDA’s IND procedures.127 In a related
vein, physicians may be motivated by an interest in seeing an approved drug approved for a new use or dosage.
Likewise, pharmaceutical companies may have an interest in seeing this happen and so might encourage physicians
who are using a drug for a non-approved use to do so under an IND in order to advance the process of getting
that drug approved for the new use.
120See FDCA § 505.
121See United States v. Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., 157 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding that violations after interstate
shipment while products are being held for sale do not come within the jurisdiction of the Act.) The Miller Amendment of 1948
reversed this decision with respect to misbranding and adulteration, but not new drugs. Thus the decision still arguably applies the
FDA’s jurisdiction with respect to new drugs.
122Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration:
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (August, 1972).
123See Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. at 26733.
124See Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503.
125Id.
126Id.
127Id.
28A similar issue arises when “physicians, usually aﬃliated with academic institutions, seek to conduct ‘clinical
investigations’ using marketed drugs, either to look for new uses or to use the drug as a research tool.”128 The
diﬀerence here is the physician’s motivation: research as opposed to treatment of his current patients. “FDA’s
position has been, and continues to be, that such investigations are subject to [the IND requirements of the
FDCA].”129 However, the FDA has exempted from the IND requirements clinical investigations that do not
present signiﬁcant safety issues to patients. Thus if “the investigation does not involve a route of administration
or dosage level or use in a patient population that signiﬁcantly increases the risk associated with use of the drug
product” and “the investigation is not intended to be reported to FDA as a well-controlled study in support of
a new indication for use, nor intended to be used to support any other signiﬁcant change in the advertising or
labeling for the drug,” then the use is exempt from the IND requirements.130
Whether a deviation from the approved use “signiﬁcantly increases” the risks associated with a drug is left to
the professional judgment of the physician.131 A new dosage level (e.g. many times higher), new dosage forms
(e.g. intravenously instead of a pill), or a new patient population (cancer drugs for non-cancer patients), are
the types of new uses that the FDA suggests would present an increased risk.132 In any event, a physician who
wanted to be on the safe side and submit an IND for a clinical investigation that may not present “signiﬁcant
increases” in risk levels would presumably not be turned away by the FDA. That is, this exemption is permissive,
not mandatory. And if there is any intent to use the information to support new labeling (that is, a new use or
dosage), the clinical study should proceed under an IND.
128Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. at 26733.
129Id.
130Id.
131Id.
132Id.
29Applying § 271(e)(1) to “Sham IND’s” and Subsequent Infringe-
ment Suits
Before examining speciﬁc types of cases that could involve § 271(e)(1) issues, it is useful to examine the various
types of utility patents and how they are infringed.
Types of Patents
In order for an invention to be patentable, it must ﬁt into one of the four statutory classes of patentable subject
matter.133 The Patent Act provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”134
An application for a patent must include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”135 It is the claims of the invention which set “the
bounds to the grant which it contains. It is to the claims of every patent, therefore, that we must turn when we
are seeking to determine what the invention is, the exclusive use of which is given to the inventor by the grant
provided for in the statute.”136
Thus for a given invention, there may be many diﬀerent ways to claim patent protection. For example, a
manufacturer may claim a drug simply by claiming a product containing a certain chemical composition. The
manufacturer may also claim a method of manufacturing the drug or a machine used to manufacture the drug.
133See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“no patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and
nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101.”)
13435 U.S.C. § 101.
13535 U.S.C. § 112.
136Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
30The manufacturer may claim the actual process by which the drug is made (a process claim) and/or the product
made by a disclosed process (a product-by-process claim). The manufacture may also claim a method of using
the drug to achieve some end, such as the treatment of a disease.
The scope of protection provided by the patent depends on the way in which protection is claimed. If the
manufacturer claims the drug as a chemical composition, it can exclude others from making, selling, or using that
drug altogether.137 However, a manufacturer may only be able to claim a new method of using a drug and not
the drug itself if the drug is old and well known. In such a case, anyone is free to make, use, or sell the drug for
any purpose except for use in the claimed method. This type of protection is more limited in scope than a claim
to the product itself, but may be very valuable nonetheless. It may be that the only current, practical use for the
drug is to treat a certain disease by the claimed method. In such a case, the manufacturer is, for all practical
purposes, aﬀorded the same protection as if it owned a patent claiming the drug as a product. No one will want
to make, use, or sell the drug for any purpose other than to be used in the claimed method, so anyone who does
make, use, or sell it will do so in connection with an infringing use.
The manufacturer may be able to get quasi-patent protection for a drug in other ways. One such way would be
to invent and claim an apparatus for delivering or administering a drug. If this apparatus were the only eﬀective
way to administer the drug, no one would be able to use the drug for its intended purpose without infringing the
apparatus patent.138 Similarly, inventing and claiming a method for using an apparatus to deliver a drug would
provide quasi-patent protection for the drug if the method and apparatus were the only practical means by which
to deliver the drug.
13735 U.S.C. § 154.
138Such a manufacturer would need to take care to avoid running afoul of the antitrust laws. For example, a manufacturer would not
be permitted to force consumers to purchase the non-patented drug, presumably at a high price, from the manufacturer by refusing to
sell the apparatus unless the consumer also bought the drug (a practice known as “tying”). However, the manufacturer is entitled to
charge whatever price it wants for its patented device. In this way, the manufacturer could extract from the consumer the maximum
amount that the consumer would be willing to pay to get the beneﬁt of the drug; the same amount as if the manufacturer owned a
patent to the drug itself.
31Whom to sue for Infringement?
The issue of whether § 271(e)(1) would apply to a party’s activities only arises, as a practical matter, if that
party is sued for infringement. A party who will never be sued does not need to worry about whether his conduct
constitutes infringement or ﬁts into an exemption.
Economics drive a patent owner’s decision-making process when it comes to whom to sue for infringement. The
simple case is where a party owns a product patent to a drug claiming the drug itself and another party is making
and selling that drug. The potentially infringing party is probably a large pharmaceutical company with millions
or even billions of dollars in sales. Such a company is an obvious target since it can aﬀord to pay damages and
damages can be calculated with relative ease. However, this company is not the only party who is infringing the
patent. The patient who uses the drug made and sold without the patent owner’s permission infringes the patent.
Luckily for the patient, it is not practical for the patent owner to sue every patient who has used an infringing
drug. And even if it were, it is not clear what the damages would be or how they would be calculated.
The matter gets more complicated when the patent in question claims a method to treat a disease using a drug.
In this case it is the doctor who directly infringes the patent because he actually uses the patented method.
There are many problems with suing doctors for infringing patents claiming methods of treatment. The ﬁrst
problem involves medical ethics. A method of treatment patent might prevent a patient from getting the best
treatment because that treatment is too expensive or a license is not available, which may result in death. Doctors
might feel bound to infringe the patent willfully to save the patient, resulting in treble damages. Secondly, if
a doctor were to infringe a method of treatment patent and the patent owner were to sue him, the patent
owner would have the unenviable task of trying to get a jury to ﬁnd a “saintly” doctor (who probably just saved
someone’s life) liable for patent infringement.
Congress recognized many of these diﬃculties and passed 35 U.S.C. 287(c) in 1997.139 This section provides:
139The motivation for passing this statute was a 1995 case in which an ophthalmologist brought an infringement action against
another ophthalmologist for using his “stitchless incision” method of cataract surgery. Though unsuccessful, this suit provoked quite
32“With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement
...[the remedies provisions] of this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health
care entity with respect to such medical activity.”140
It is very important to notice that this provision does not declare that such activity “shall not be infringement”
the way § 271(e)(1) does. It merely provides that a patent owner cannot recover damages or obtain an injunction
against a doctor or related health care entity for infringement.141
Parties who directly infringe a patent are not the only ones who may be held liable for infringement. The law
also “imposes liability upon persons who aid or abet direct infringement by others.”142 This liability, known as
contributory infringement, has two components. The ﬁrst part is selling or oﬀering to sell “a component of a
patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention.”143 The second component involves “knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”144 Additionally, there must be
direct infringement by someone that the contributory infringer is contributing to. “There can be no contributory
infringement of patent without fact or intention of direct infringement.”145
Thus the manufacturer who sells a drug to a doctor, knowing that the drug will be used to infringe a method
of treatment patent is liable as a contributory infringer, but only if there are no other “substantial noninfringing
a bit of outrage. See Pallin v. Singer, Civ. No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
14035 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
141The statute gives the following non-exhaustive list of related heath care entities: nursing home, hospital, university, medical school,
health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic. Note that this list does not include drug manufacturers.
142Donald S. Chisum, 5-17 Chisum on Patents § 17.01.
14335 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1).
144Id.
145Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 32 L.Ed.2d 273, 92 S.Ct 1700, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972), rehearing
denied, 409 U.S. 902, 34 L.Ed.2d 165, 93 S.Ct. 94 (1972); and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Amstar Corp.
v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1987)); and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1974 (1993)); and (superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Subaﬁlms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 94 C.D.O.S. 3381, 94 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6457,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746 (9th Cir. 1994)).
33uses” for the drug. In such a situation, the doctor is the direct infringer, even though he is not liable for this
infringement because of § 287(c). The patent owner can recover the full amount of the damages from the
contributory infringer since “[a] party that induces or contributes to infringement is jointly and severally liable
with the direct infringer for all general damages.”146
While § 287(c) will not protect a contributory infringer, § 271(e)(1) will. A party may not be accused of
contributing to infringement where the infringement is a result of the activity of a doctor that is using a patented
device or process “solely for uses reasonably related” to gaining FDA approval. Such activity is not infringement,
thus there is no direct infringement, and there cannot be contributory infringement.147
One Example of How a Party Might Use a “Sham IND” to Infringe a Patent
Imagine that a small pharmaceutical company has invented and patented a method for treating a certain condition.
This method involves using an apparatus that the company has not patented but that has no other substantial,
non-infringing use. The method also involves the use of old, well-known compounds. The non-patented apparatus
is used to deliver these compounds.
The condition in question aﬀects a relatively small percentage of the population. Unlike heart disease, cancer,
HIV/AIDS, etc., there is not a tremendous amount of money to be made such that the large pharmaceutical
companies would be interested in devoting major resources to this disease. The patented treatment is not a cure-
146Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics International, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
147Deepsouth, 406 U.S. 518.
34all for this disease; rather it provides a small but not insigniﬁcant improvement compared to current treatments
available.
The company has received FDA approval for treating a particular condition in a particular group of patients. The
patent, however, covers a method that is useful to treat a variety of closely related diseases in a diverse group of
patients. (For example, the method of treatment patent covers treating people who have breathing diﬃculties.
The company has obtained FDA approval to use the method and apparatus to treat patients with asthma. The
method would also be potentially useful to treat patients with emphysema.) The company can sell the apparatus
to doctors who intend to use the apparatus to treat the wide variety of diseases (whether under an IND or not).
Because of the patent, the company is able to sell the apparatus and compounds to doctors and patients at a
price signiﬁcantly above the cost of producing each unit. The company can charge whatever price it wants since
no competitor can oﬀer a lower price.148 Because of this “legal monopoly” power, the company is able to recoup
its research and development costs and maybe even make a substantial proﬁt (e.g., several million dollars).
If a competitor wanted to enter the market, it would face two obstacles. The ﬁrst would be FDA approval to sell
the apparatus. This may not seem to be too signiﬁcant a hurdle if the apparatus is relatively simple and/or the
compounds involved are already approved for other uses. However, the FDA will not grant such approval until
the second obstacle, the patent, expired.149
The competitor could avoid all these diﬃculties by utilizing the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. One way to do this would
be to require any physician who wanted to purchase the apparatus to have a sponsor-investigator or treatment
IND. Many of the physicians who would want to use the patented product work in research hospitals and are
quite familiar with the IND process and have probably applied for IND’s in the past. Once the IND is in place,
the competitor company could sell the apparatus without being liable for infringement because it will be used
148The company would, presumably, charge the proﬁt-maximizing price. That is, it would charge as much as it could without losing
too many customers. Since total proﬁts are equal to the proﬁt per unit times the number of units sold, and the number of units sold
will vary with the price, the company will select the price that leads to the greatest total proﬁts.
14935 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
35for a “use” reasonably related to seeking FDA approval. Another way to get the beneﬁt of the § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor would be to for the company to ﬁle for an IND itself. It could then sell to any doctor it wanted as long as
it conditioned the sales on participation in the clinical study.
These types of IND’s could be called “Sham IND’s” because the IND holder did not obtain the IND for the
purpose of investigating a new drug. The IND was obtained in order to gain the beneﬁt of the safe harbor under
§ 271(e)(1) for otherwise commercial sales activity.
The competitor company is not free to charge whatever price it wants for the apparatus or compounds sold pursuant
to an IND. Under FDA regulations, the sponsor of a clinical trial “may not commercialize an investigational drug by
charging a price larger than that necessary to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and handling
of the drug.”150 If the sponsor of a clinical trial wants to charge for the drug at all, it must get FDA approval
and must explain why charging is necessary.151 For a smaller company, it may be impossible to ﬁnance the cost
of an investigation without being able to charge, especially if the apparatus or compounds are expensive. In such
a case, one would expect the FDA to allow the manufacturer to charge.
In order to prevent its commercialization, FDA regulations also prohibit the promotion of an investigational
drug before it is approved.152 The regulations also prohibit prolonging an investigation after the results of the
investigation appear to establish suﬃcient data to support an application for FDA approval.153 This prevents a
company from continuing to sell the drug for investigational purposes once the investigation is completed.
The House Report accompanying § 271(e)(1) makes clear that Congress did not intend for § 271(e)(1) to allow
the unlimited commercial sale of investigational drugs. However, Congress did see the need for commercial sales
of the investigational drug to investigators. “This section does not permit the commercial sale of a patented drug
by the party using the drug to develop [information related to FDA approval], but it does permit the commercial
15021 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3).
15121 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(2).
15221 C.F.R. § 312.7(a).
15321 C.F.R. § 312.7(c).
36sale of research quantities of active ingredients to such parties.”154
Why a Company Might Want to Use a “Sham IND”
Since a company is prohibited from making a proﬁt from selling an investigational drug, why would a company
ﬁle a “sham IND” in order to sell the drug? One reason is that they might be able to make a proﬁt despite
the prohibition against doing so. The regulations permit the seller of an investigational drug to recover costs of
manufacture, research, development, and handling of the drug.155 The company may be able to play a lot of
accounting games with the numbers corresponding to these expenses. For example, the company may have many
researchers working on many diﬀerent projects at the same time. It may be diﬃcult to allocate the salary of a given
researcher to the expenses involved with each project on a perfectly proportional basis. A slight over-allocation
to the investigational drug would result in a cost on paper higher than the actual cost to the company. The
diﬀerence in the two costs would be proﬁt.
Similarly, the company may need to build a new machine to manufacture the apparatus or drug. The machine,
once built, may be used for another project in the future. Or it may be sold in the future. How would a company
account for this? If the company simply allocated the entire cost of the machine to the expense of creating
the investigational drug, it would be overstating costs and making a proﬁt equal to the diﬀerence between the
overstated and actual costs.
Even if a company could and did allocate costs proportionally, it may still be better oﬀ by selling the investigational
drug at cost than it would be without those sales. Any increase in eﬃciency or synergy due to the new drug’s
154H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
15521 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3).
37manufacture would be captured as proﬁt. This can be illustrated as follows. Say, for example, that a company
used to sell only Drug A. Upon deciding to sell an equal amount of an investigational drug with the same costs as
Drug A, the company’s expenses would increase; it would now be selling twice as many drugs. But it would not
need to double its factory space. Some machines could be used for both drugs. Though the number of employees
would increase, the company would probably not need to double the size of the management and support staﬀ
(they would not need two payroll clerks, two receptionists, etc.). Thus the company would realize eﬃciencies and
synergies.
In this example, the cost of producing the two drugs would rightfully be allocated 50/50. Say, for example, the sales
of Drug A were $100 and the costs were $50, leaving $50 in proﬁt. After deciding to produce the investigational
drug, say the new cost to produce both drugs would be $80. The costs attributable to the investigational drug
would be $40 ($80 split 50/50), thus that drug could be sold for $40. The new total sales would be $140. With
total costs of $80, the company’s proﬁt would be $60.
Even if a company would make little or no proﬁt by selling the investigational drug, it may have other, less noble,
reasons for wanting to do so. One such reason might be to injure a competitor. The company would set a price
somewhere near its actual costs (maybe with a small proﬁt as discussed above). By selling at a lower price, the
company would lure away the customers of its competitor, the patent owner. The competitor would have to lower
its price to match the lowest price or it would eventually lose most or all of its customers. The competitor would
now be selling at a price that does not enable it to recover the costs it incurred as the ﬁrst to develop this new
treatment. Instead of being handsomely rewarded for its successful innovation, the competitor is ruined.
This competitor likely competes in other areas as well. By taking away its proﬁts, the competitor would have
38fewer resources to use to develop new products in the future. The competitor might go out of business altogether,
leaving more market share for the company that is left. With fewer competitors, the company might be able to
charge a higher price for all of its products.
This company represents the worst kind of Holmesian bad man. It may have no intention of seeking FDA
approval for its product once the patent expires. Maybe this is because the process of seeking FDA approval is
too expensive. Maybe by the time the patent expires, the method of treatment will be obsolete (a very realistic
possibility). Or maybe the company will eventually seek FDA approval for treating one particular species of the
condition, knowing it will then be able to sell its product for use in treating any condition a doctor wants it for.
This company may be achieving the Congressional goal of having competition as soon as the patent expires,156
but it is also able to achieve competition before the patent expires and destroy much of the value of a patent. It
also harms the patent system since a patentee may not even be able to recover the expenses involved in created
the patented product or method.
Trying to Stop a “Sham IND” Holder
It is not clear that a court would be able to stop a “sham IND” holder from selling the patented product with
damages or an injunction. Since the test under Intermedics does not allow the court look to purposes, a potential
plaintiﬀ would be prevented from introducing evidence regarding purpose. The court could not inquire into why
the potential infringer sought an IND. The court could not inquire into whether the potential infringer intended
to eventually apply for FDA approval. The potential infringer would only need to show that it had an IND and
156H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
39that its use of the patented product was pursuant to that IND.
If an IND provides a shield against an infringement action, the next logical question for a patentee would be
whether it could attack the validity of the IND. The patentee might try to get the FDA to terminate the IND.
Federal Regulations provide that IND’s may be terminated for a variety of reasons.157 Many of these have to do
with safety concerns, failures to report information, or with deviations from the terms of the IND. The Regulations
also provide that an IND may be terminated if “[t]he drug is being promoted or distributed for commercial purposes
not justiﬁed by the requirements of the investigation or permitted by § 312.7.”158
A patentee may want to attack the decision to allow an IND by arguing that the investigation is not likely to
generate scientiﬁcally useful results that will advance the approval process. The FDA assesses “the scientiﬁc
quality of the clinical investigations and the likelihood that the investigations will yield data capable of meeting
statutory standards for marketing approval” in IND’s for Phase 2 and 3 studies.159 However, the FDA does not
assess these factors for Phase 1 studies, instead focusing only on assuring the safety of the patients.160 The FDA
relies on Institutional Review Boards to make sure that investigators are not doing studies that will produce no
scientiﬁcally useful results and thereby endanger patients’ lives and waste everyone’s time for no good reason.
It is not at all clear how a patentee might be able to bring a suit challenging any of the above. The patentee
could try to get a hearing, but an IND, like an NDA, is a private license and the FDCA only permits the applicant
to request a hearing.161 The patentee could try to sue the infringer directly, alleging a violation of the FDCA,
but there is no private right of action in the FDCA.162 The patentee could bring suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act, but would have to argue that the FDA’s actions in allowing the IND or failing to terminate it
were arbitrary and capricious.163 This showing is diﬃcult to make. The court would have to ﬁnd “a clear error in
15721 C.F.R. § 312.44.
15821 C.F.R. § 312.44(b)(1)(v).
15921 C.F.R. § 312.22(a).
160Id.
161See Hutt, supra note 76, at 1270.
162Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
1635 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A).
40judgment” on the part of the FDA.164 The court is not allowed to concern itself with the wisdom of the agency
action or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.165 It is also not clear that the patentee is “harmed” in
a way that would entitle it to standing to bring such a suit.166
The patentee’s best chance might be to ﬁle an infringement action and then reply to the inevitable § 271(e)(1)
defense by challenging the defendant’s assertion that the use is reasonably related to seeking approval despite the
IND. The patentee would have to argue that because the IND is a sham, the use is not reasonably related to
seeking FDA approval. This might convince the judge to allow evidence on whether the IND is a sham. On the
other hand, the judge might be likely to defer to the “wisdom of the agency action” and be wary of “substituting
his judgment” for that of the FDA. After all, the FDA has procedures for monitoring IND’s and terminating them
if they are being used for commercial purposes. If the FDA has not terminated an IND, it must either think there
is at least some potential scientiﬁc beneﬁt or be completely incompetent and blind to the IND holder’s abuse of
the system. The court may not want to, or be able to, determine which is the case.
Is the Courts’ Broader Reading of § 271(e)(1) a Good Thing?
Whether one views the present broad reading of § 271(e)(1) as a positive development probably depends on the
individual’s views about the general purposes of intellectual property laws. The current state of the law would
probably not sit well with someone who approaches the patent system with a “natural rights” perspective. If
inventors are supposed to be entitled to reap the reward of the fruits of their labor and innovation, then a law
164Norwich Eaton Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 486, 493 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
165Id.
166These issues of standing, private rights of action, and suits under the APA are very complex and beyond the scope of this paper.
41which allows that reward to be lost in certain situations would be unjust.
But the “natural rights” approach to patents (and other types of property law) has fallen out of favor over the
years. Even the Constitution declares that the purpose of any patent laws enacted by Congress was to be the
promotion of the progress of the useful arts. The intellectual property clause does not read, “To ensure that
inventors receive the rewards to which they are entitled....” Indeed, the courts have long recognized that patents
are an aﬃrmative grant by Congress and that Congress is free to limit the rights granted as it pleases.167 If
Congress were to decide that scientiﬁc progress is best promoted by granting a very broad infringement exemption
for any activity that remotely resembles research activity, it would certainly be within its constitutional mandate
to do so. The wisdom of creating such an exemption is a separate question. If this exemption eliminated the
incentives for investing in research because of the uncertainty of being able to recover this investment, it would
clearly be a mistake.
Rather than eliminate incentives, it is possible that a more limited exemption, like the current exemption under §
271(e)(1), would hamper progress only in certain areas. The development of products with major markets that
are unaﬀected by a small amount of research-related competition would be unaﬀected by the exemption. On the
other hand, innovation in areas where the available rewards are limited and the need for more innovation is great
could be harmed. These areas that are ripe for continued innovation would be ﬁlled with more potentially exempt
research-related activities. The ability to reap a reward may be delayed until a problem is completely solved and
a patent can be obtained on a product or method that requires no further research. The wisdom of this type of
system for promoting scientiﬁc progress is questionable.
A more interesting question is whether Congress intended to create as broad an exemption to infringement as
has been created by § 271(e)(1). Congress imagined the normal case under § 271(e)(1) would be a generic drug
167See, e.g., Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900) (Congress, having created the monopoly, may put
such limitations upon it as it pleases.).
42company preparing to enter the market for a drug that has big sales. Its use of the patented drug for testing
would have an imperceptible eﬀect on the market. Congress apparently did not consider the case where the
market is such that investigational use (under an IND) might account for a signiﬁcant portion of the market or
where investigational use might be an alternative to the use of the patented drug in an approved treatment.
As discussed above, the legislative history suggests that Congress had in mind the more limited issue of the
availability of generic drugs. The House Report had in mind the case where “the only purpose of the experiments
is to seek FDA approval for the commercial sale of the drug after the patent expires.”168 The Roche case had
discussed the limited scope of the “experimental use” exemption and Congress could have decided to expand the
“experimental use” exemption beyond its common law scope to include all kinds of experimentation with patented
inventions. Instead, Congress chose to limit 271(e)(1) to uses related to FDA approval, suggesting a decision to
create a very narrow exemption.
Another question is whether Congress decided to create an exemption that would cause economic harm to patent
holders. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce did not think that § 271(e)(1) would have “any adverse
economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the life of a patent.”169 Likewise, the House Judiciary
Committee wrote, “The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial marketplace
during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not
substantial.”170 It seems that any interpretation of § 271(e)(1) that does adversely impact patent holders would
be inconsistent with Congress’ intent.
Of course, Congress could have written § 271(e)(1) using narrower language, tailored to the generic drug situation,
if it wanted to avoid the present diﬃculties. On the other hand, Congress may not have foreseen the possibility
168H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
169H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
170H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2692.
43of the present interpretation of the statute when they wrote it, especially given the fact that the court in Scripps
was able to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the Congressional intent as stated in the House
Reports.
In the end, will companies that manage to secure IND’s have total immunity from patent infringement suits for
all time? Probably not. Someone will undoubtedly get “too cute” with the whole process and invite a judicial or
even congressional response. Hopefully, Congress will address the issue and clarify exactly what kind and breadth
of “experimental use” exemption it intends to grant in order to best promote the progress of the useful arts.
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